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ABSTRACT  
Following their larger counterparts, an increasing number of small firms outsource their IT 
tasks to lower cost offshore destinations. For small firms, however, offshore outsourcing is a 
difficult undertaking as it involves high transaction costs. Online marketplaces for IT services, 
which have recently become available to small firms, make offshore IT outsourcing more 
accessible and manageable, although differences in the marketplace design result in varying 
outcomes across the marketplaces. This has consequences for SME’s decision as to  which 
online marketplace to use, because different markets may have different types of benefits and 
costs. This paper sets to analyze some of the similarities and differences between online 
marketplaces for IT services and their effects for small firms. First, we analyze if and how 
online marketplaces reduce small firms’ transaction costs in offshore IT outsourcing. Second, 
we examine the effects of market entry barriers on outcomes of online marketplaces and their 
implications for small firms. The results indicate that online marketplaces for IT services do 
reduce transaction costs for small firms in offshore outsourcing across ten specific market 
processes. More surprising, however, is the finding that the lower market entry barriers for 
suppliers result in lower prices for buyers without compromising other aspects of market 
performance. 
Keywords: offshore IT outsourcing, online market, reverse auction, process-stakeholder 
analysis. 
 1. INTRODUCTION 
Offshore outsourcing of IT services has become a large industry in India, Russia, Eastern 
Europe, China, and other regions of the world, employing hundreds of thousands of people and 
generating tens of billions dollars in turnover on a yearly basis (Carmel and Tija 2005). 
Although offshore IT outsourcing has gone mainstream, until recently large businesses were 
the only ones enjoying the lion’s share of benefits from offshore IT outsourcing as well as the 
attention from the academic community in this respect.  
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are a potential source of tremendous demand for 
offshore IT outsourcing services. European SMEs alone are predicted to spend USD 109 bln on 
IT investments in 20061. Their demand for offshore IT outsourcing, however, remains to be 
realized! In comparison to their larger counterparts, SMEs face more difficulties with the 
access to IT resources due to factors, such as poorer access to financing (Dean, et al. 1998) and 
poorer in-house availability of dedicated high-skilled technical personnel (Nooteboom 1993). 
In offshore IT outsourcing SMEs face relatively high costs of contacting, contracting, and 
controlling suppliers than large firms (Carmel and Nicholson 2005). 
For SMEs, the recent rise of online marketplaces for professional services came as a blessing. 
Online marketplaces facilitate SMEs’ access to offshore resources by providing functionality 
for supplier search, projects allocation and execution. The leading online marketplaces with a 
strong focus on IT include Elance Online, Rent a Coder, and eWork. In the early 2006 Rent a 
Coder was facilitating over 12 thousand IT projects on a monthly basis while enjoying a 60% 
yearly growth (Radkevitch 2006). Elance Online has conducted transactions for over USD 90 
million since the marketplace launched in 19992. 
                                                 
1 http://www.allbusiness.com/periodicals/article/441101-1.html 
2 www.elance.com 
These marketplaces typically support a similar range of core exchange functionality, such as 
catalogues of suppliers; project pricing and allocation by means of reverse auctions; settlement 
of payments; workspace; and supplier rating and feedback systems (Snir & Hitt, 2003). The 
differences between the marketplaces are in more subtle design dimensions such as the level of 
market entry barriers or collaboration functionality. According to the electronic markets 
literature, aspects of market design account for differences in the success and outcomes of 
online marketplaces (Kambil and van Heck 1998, Koppius 2002). In particular, while having 
low market entry barriers is important to attract the critical mass of buyers and suppliers 
(Kambil and van Heck 2002), entry of low quality participants of both types results in a large 
proportion of potential deals being cancelled (Radkevitch, et al. 2006, Snir and Hitt 2003).  
The objective of this paper is two-fold. First, this paper aims to analyze how online 
marketplaces for IT services facilitate SMEs’ access to offshore IT resources. We look at ten 
distinct market processes of a leading online marketplace, and discuss their effect on buyer and 
supplier transaction costs through the facets of the process-stakeholder analysis framework 
developed by Kambil and van Heck (1998). Second, we consider differences in entry barriers 
of two leading online marketplaces, and empirically analyze their impact on market outcomes 
along three dimensions: the percentage of awarded projects, average project price, and average 
satisfaction with the supplier. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of literature on 
offshore IT outsourcing, economics of small firms and their use of IT, and on online markets. 
In Section 3 we analyze the transaction cost reduction effects of online marketplaces. In 
Section 4 we elaborate on market entry barriers and formulate hypotheses relating entry 
barriers to market outcomes. Section 5 is dedicated to hypotheses testing and discussion of the 
results. Section 6 presents conclusions of the study.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Offshore IT outsourcing 
Offshore IT outsourcing is a complex business arrangement that reaches across national and 
cultural borders. Academic research on both “local” and offshore IT outsourcing centers on 
issues such as outsourcing decisions (Ang & Straub, 1998; Poppo & Zenger, 1998), managing 
relationships and processes with outsourcing partners (Feeny, et al. 2005, Rottman and Lacity 
2006, Sabherwal 1999), and handling transaction costs and risks in outsourcing (Carmel and 
Tija 2005, Kliem 2004, Lee, et al. 2004). 
IT outsourcing starts with a decision to outsource. Transaction costs defined by transaction 
attributes, such as asset specificity and measurement difficulty, and production efficiencies 
associated with outsourcing influence outsourcing decisions and degree of outsourcing (Ang 
and Straub 1998). When outsourcing goes offshore, criteria such as business environment, 
political risks, labor pool size, and costs need to be analyzed in the choice of offshore 
destination (Carmel and Tija 2005). A number of specific selection criteria, such as language 
skills, international experience global presence, and infrastructure have to be considered when 
selecting an offshore outsourcing provider, in addition to a general set of criteria such as costs, 
reputation, financial stability, processes, etc. (Carmel and Tija 2005). 
Managing offshore outsourcing contracts once they are under way is even a more complex task. 
Costs of control make up the greatest portion of buyer’s transaction costs. Due to 
micromanagement, transaction costs of US companies amount to 50% of offshore outsourcing 
contract volume, while they are only 5 to 10% when domestic outsourcing companies are 
involved (Rottman and Lacity 2006). Competitive bidding and ambiguity of the specifications 
of IT projects may result in outsourcing providers falling prey to winner’s curse that can 
negatively affect performance of all parties involved (Kern, et al. 2002). The success of 
offshore outsourcing projects is also dependent on the relationships that develop between the 
parties, particularly on trust, cooperation and joint problem solving (Feeny, et al. 2005, 
Sabherwal 1999). These relationships are dynamic and can develop either through a virtuous or 
a vicious (distrust) cycle (Sabherwal, 1999), making proper control of the relationship of great 
importance.  
2.2. Economics of small firms and the use of IT 
Small firms received special treatment in the economic and managerial literature due to a 
number of properties that make them different from large firms. Small firms enjoy a number of 
advantages over their large counterparts, but also suffer from specific disadvantages. The 
advantages are of a behavioral nature, while the disadvantages are rooted in poorer availability 
of material resources (Nooteboom, 1993). Due to factors, such as the entrepreneurial drive, risk 
taking, motivation and perseverance, less bureaucracy, greater flexibility as well as proximity 
of management to the customer and to production, SMEs can be potentially successful in 
competition (Nooteboom, 1993). On the other hand, small firms generally face smaller 
economies of scale and scope, as well as inferior economies of experience and learning 
(Nooteboom, 1993). 
Disadvantages of small firms can be best explained via the facets of transaction costs 
economics (TCE) that analyses transaction governance choices on the basis of underlying 
transaction costs (Williamson, 1975). Nooteboom (1993) analyzed the effect of firm’s size on 
the transaction costs along the dimensions of contact, contract, and control. By discussing the 
effects of the economies of scope, scale, experience, and learning, he showed that small firms 
bear higher costs to contact, contract, and control a transaction partner. Small firms appear to 
be less capable of making use of these economies due to bounded rationality, uncertainty, and 
asset specificity (Nooteboom, 1993).  
Small firms also face more difficulties with the IT resources due to poorer access to financial 
resources (Dean et al., 1998) and poorer in-house availability of dedicated high-skilled 
technical personnel (Nooteboom, 1993). Extending the work of Nooteboom, (Carmel and 
Nicholson 2005) showed that small firms are also less involved in offshore IT outsourcing due 
to relatively higher costs of contacting, contracting, and controlling offshore vendors. These 
costs encompass, correspondingly: 1) search costs (costs of marketing – in case of suppliers); 
2) costs of drawing a contract, negotiating, and obtaining information on supplier reliability, 
etc.; and 3) costs of monitoring, dispute resolution, renegotiation, and arbitration, etc 
(Nooteboom, 1993).  
In order to offset the impediments to offshore IT outsourcing, small firms can use a number of 
transaction cost reduction approaches such as liaison of knowledge flows, gaining experience, 
and providing control channels (from the supplier’s side), etc (Carmel and Nicholson 2005). 
Carmel and Nicholson (2005) pointed out a significant role of the marketplace, which is 
implicitly defined as consisting of market actors including intermediaries and vendors, in the 
reduction of transaction costs. Vendors contribute to the transaction costs reduction by 
simplifying contracting, providing control channels, and standardizing services, while 
intermediaries provide expertise and knowledge on offshore outsourcing (Carmel and 
Nicholson 2005).  
2.3. Online markets for IT services  
Online market is defined as an interorganizational information system through which multiple 
buyers and sellers interact to accomplish one or more of the following market-making 
activities: identifying potential trading partners; selecting a specific partner, and executing the 
transaction (Choudhury, et al. 1998). Early literature on online marketplaces predicted that the 
reduction of coordination costs due to the introduction of IT would lead to a shift from 
hierarchy to market governance (Malone, et al. 1987), while decrease in search costs would 
result in higher allocation efficiency and lower prices (Bakos 1991). Later studies found that 
the outcomes of online markets are not necessarily better than those of traditional markets due 
to factors, such as differences in quality and transportation cost (Bailey, Peterson, & Brorsen, 
1991), and information available during the exchange (Koppius 2002).  
Online markets for IT services became a focal point of research on market outcomes not long 
after the term “e-lance economy” was introduced by (Malone and Laubacher 1998) to label an 
economy largely based on temporary organizations of individuals that emerge and dissolve 
when business opportunities arise and disappear, and where IT serves to link individual nodes 
(Malone, Yates & Benjamin, 1987).  
While IT decreases the coordination costs of the linking mechanism (most often a market-based 
mechanism) (Malone, Yates & Benjamin, 1987), the costs faced by supplier and buyers of 
placing and evaluating a bid respectively, will not go to zero. In one of the first such studies the 
effect of costly bidding and bid evaluation at reverse auctions at online marketplace for IT 
services was examined by Snir and Hitt (2003), who found that more expensive projects tend to 
attract on average lower quality suppliers, resulting in buyers often withdrawing from auctions 
without awarding their contracts to suppliers. Moreover, when an auction attracts too few bids 
it becomes uneconomical for the buyer to perform evaluation and award her contract either 
(Carr 2003). Opportunistic behavior of buyers, who use online marketplaces for comparison 
shopping or look for free consultations from suppliers, was identified as another reason for not 
awarding contracts (Radkevitch, et al. 2006).  
Finally, market design also accounts for a variation in the outcomes of online marketplaces. 
The way the market processes are embodied by the functionality of online markets, also affects 
benefits and costs for buyers, suppliers and market makers, eventually resulting in marketplace 
success or failure (Kambil and van Heck 2002). Market processes left aside, what type of 
information is made available to whom during the market process also impacts outcomes of the 
market (Koppius 2002). 
3. ONLINE MARKETS’ EFFECTS ON TRANSACTION COSTS 
OF SMEs IN OFFSHORE IT OUTSOURCING 
According to (Nooteboom, 1993), one of the factors accounting for SMEs’ relatively higher 
transaction costs is that their rationality is “more bounded”, which results from their inferior 
capacities of information processing as well as from poorer availability of specialized 
personnel. To compensate for this type of bounded rationality, SMEs might buy in the 
necessary expertise (e.g. in procurement, IT, and finance, etc.), which, however, involves 
additional transactional costs (Nooteboom, 1993). Nooteboom (1993) also predicts a trend 
toward trilateral governance in transactions with small firms, where a third party would 
exercise functions of control and arbitration. Finally, he suggests applying collective or 
institutional efforts to mitigate transaction or governance costs by restricting opportunistic 
behavior and uncertainty (Nooteboom, 1993).  
Online marketplaces help SMEs overcome their specific disadvantage quite in line with the 
directions outlined above. In principle, online marketplaces can enable smarter buying by 
providing SMEs with advice, standardized processes, and reference projects; they take on the 
transaction governance role by setting exchange rules and assuming the arbitration function; 
they provide rating and feedback tools that help distinguish reliable and reputable participants 
from lower quality participants and potential opportunists. 
Table 1. Leading online marketplaces for IT services 
Marketplace 
(year 
launched) 
Scope  Key Features Participation Entry for 
suppliers 
Business 
Model  
Elance Online 
(1999) 
Professional 
services 
Catalogue of suppliers; reverse 
auctions; invoice management and 
payments; project management; 
rating and feedback system. 
Suppliers and projects screen
Over 1.000 
open projects 
simultaneously 
Free and fee-
based 
membership 
Supplier 
funded  
eWork (1999)  Professional ing; No data Suppliers pay Supplier 
services catalogue of suppliers; reverse an entry fee funded 
auctions; invoice management a
payments; project management; 
rating and feedback system. 
nd 
 by 
etplace 
Rent-a-coder IT and related Catalogue of suppliers; reverse 
nd 
Over 12.000 Supplier 
Guru.com 
(2000)  
Professional 
services anagement and 
osted 
projects per 
Free and fee-
based 
re 
Supplier 
funded 
Scriptlance 
(2001) 
IT and related 
services anagement and 
1125 projects 
open (accessed 
Supplier 
funded 
GetACoder 
(2004) 
IT and related 
services d 
ccounts; 
cts 
posted during 
30 last days 
Free Supplier 
funded 
oDesk (2004) Freelance 
staffing  
 of 
ce 
yments; project 
 
Suppliers 
screened by 
the 
e 
Buyer 
funded 
 
The leading online marketplaces with a strong focus on IT services include Elance Online, Rent 
 Coder, eWork. Guru.com, GetACoder, and Scriptlance. Table 1 provides an overview of 
and are 
screened
the 
mark
Free 
(2001) services  auctions; invoice management a
payments; escrow accounts; 
project management; rating and 
feedback system.  
Catalogue of suppliers; reverse 
auctions; invoice m
projects 
executed per 
month 
6.300 p
funded 
payments; escrow accounts; 
project management; rating and 
feedback system. 
Catalogue of suppliers; reverse 
auctions; invoice m
month membership 
types a
possible 
Free 
payments; escrow accounts; 
project management; rating and 
feedback system.  
Catalogue of suppliers; reverse 
auctions; invoice management an
payments; escrow a
28.06.06) 
1725 proje
project management; rating and 
feedback system.  
Supplier screening; Catalogue
suppliers; reverse auctions; invoi
management and pa
(accessed 
28.06.06) 
500+ projects 
open 
management; bug tracking; online
supplier monitoring; daily status 
reports; activity log; code version 
control; rating and feedback 
system. 
marketplac
a
these marketplaces. The exchange is normally organized as follows. First, buyers and suppliers 
register at the marketplace. Participation for buyers is free of charge while a periodical fee 
and/or commission for transactions applies to suppliers. Then, the buyer starts an auction by 
posting a request for proposals with details on her project. The project allocation mechanism 
comes in two basic types: open reverse auctions (all suppliers can bid for the project) and 
invite-only auctions (only invited suppliers can bid). One or multiple winners can be selected. 
Services delivery is supported by the online document management system, message board, 
and milestone tracking functionality. Finally, when a project is accomplished, the buyer can 
assign a rating to the supplier and provide a feedback on supplier’s performance. In the analysis 
of market processes below we provide more details on how these marketplaces function.  
The hypotheses to be tested in subsequent section are as follows: 
Hypothesis 1a: Online marketplaces for IT services reduce costs of contact for small 
 for IT services reduce costs of contract for small 
 for IT services reduce costs of control for small 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS PART 1 
The effects of online m
older analysis framework in a slightly different way, 
companies in offshore IT outsourcing. 
Hypothesis 1b: Online marketplaces
companies in offshore IT outsourcing. 
Hypothesis 1c: Online marketplaces
companies in offshore IT outsourcing. 
arketplaces on the transaction costs of SMEs in offshore IT outsourcing 
are analyzed with the help of process-stakeholder analysis framework, developed by Kambil et 
al., 1998, to evaluate online marketplace adoption. The conventional way to apply the process-
stakeholder analysis framework is to analyze ten market processes of a specific online 
marketplace, and their effects on buyers, suppliers, and market makers. These ten processes are 
product representation, regulation, risk management, influence, dispute resolution, search, 
pricing, logistics (which we term “service delivery” here), payment and settlement, and 
authentication (Kambil and van Heck 1998). The analysis identifies the net benefit or loss that 
each type of stakeholders incurs from participation in the marketplace, which explains 
marketplace adoption success or failure.  
In this study we apply the process-stakeh
by analyzing the different market processes with regard to their effect on transaction costs of 
SMEs in offshore IT outsourcing. Since the framework has some of its roots in the transaction 
costs theory we believe it to be appropriate to map it on three types of transaction costs – costs 
of contact, contract, and control – used by (Nooteboom, 1993) to analyses SMEs’ 
disadvantages in comparison to large firms. 
On the empirical side, the analysis is based on a leading marketplace for IT service, Rent A 
Coder. Rent A Coder was founded in 2001 and focuses on IT and related services. In the early 
2006 the marketplace was facilitating over 12 thousand IT projects on a monthly basis while 
enjoying a 60% yearly growth (Radkevitch, 2006). The ten market processes at Rent A Coder 
are organized as follows: 
Search. Rent A Coder maintains a searchable (by skills, country, and other attributes) catalogue 
of suppliers. Supplier profiles contain detailed information on their skills, experience, and past 
projects.  
Pricing. Three match-making and pricing mechanisms are available for buyers – open reverse 
auction, private auction and one-to-one project. Request for proposals posted via reverse 
auctions are available for bids to all registered suppliers, while private auctions involve only 
invited suppliers. One-to-one projects are for suppliers with who the buyer has worked 
previously. The requests for proposals contain project description, requirements for the 
deliverables, budget estimation and indication of a deadline. Supplier’s bids contain bid amount 
and text description. Supplementary files such as detailed proposals, mock-ups, and examples 
of code can be attached to the bid. 
Logistics (service delivery). Rent A Coder provides functionality to exchange comments and 
files via a message board. Source code and other types of deliverables (e.g. elements of web 
design, programmes, etc) can also be delivered this way.  
Payment and settlement. Payments can be managed via internal payment system; money is held 
at the account before the work is accomplished. A number of payment options are available, 
including PayPal, mail checks, and bank wire transfer, etc. This flexibility is important when 
buyer and supplier come from different countries.  
Authentication. Buyers and suppliers can rate one another and provide performance feedbacks, 
which forms their reputation at the online marketplace.  
Product representation. Detailed supplier profiles are available at the marketplace. Supplier’s 
qualification can be certified by a third party organization “Expert Rating”. Buyers’ feedback 
and ratings for previous projects in aggregated and detailed form are directly available in the 
supplier’s profile.  
Regulation. Participation at the marketplace for buyers and supplier is subject to Terms and 
Conditions, and Custom Software Seller Agreement. Issues such as communications between 
buyer and supplier, payments, use of 3rd party code are subject to these regulations. Users 
violating the rules might be expelled from the marketplace.  
Risk management. Escrow accounts, buyer /supplier rating, and feedback system as well as 3rd 
party certification of suppliers’ skills contribute to establishing trust at the marketplace.  
Influence. Escrow accounts, buyer /supplier rating, and feedback system as well as 3rd party 
certification of suppliers’ skills contribute to establishing trust at the marketplace.  
Dispute resolution. Arbitration procedure is available for buyers and suppliers in case there are 
disputes that cannot be resolved by other means. Internal investigation team performs the 
arbitration.  
The analysis is summarized in Table 2. Column Process identifies a market process, column 
Description provides a brief description of the process and columns Effect on buyers and Effect 
on suppliers specify the effect of the market process on transaction costs of the respective 
stakeholder (compared to a situation when an SME would embark on offshore outsourcing on 
its own, i.e. without relying on an online marketplace). 
Table 2. Analysis of the effects of online marketplace processes on buyers’ and suppliers’ transaction costs  
Process Impact in offshore IT 
outsourcing 
Effect on buyers Effect on suppliers 
Search Details on supplies from dozens 
of countries are available in a 
searchable database in an easy to 
compare format. 
Reduces contact costs 
(e.g. by comparison to 
search via yellow pages, 
etc.). 
Reduces contact costs 
(e.g. in comparison to 
participating in IT fairs, 
or direct marketing). 
Pricing auctions es contact costs nd 
Logistics (service 
delivery)  f a file delivery and 
 control costs 
and 
settlement  with 
Reduces control costs Reduces control costs 
ould 
 
providing information on 
provider quality and thus 
s 
need to verify buyer 
trustworthiness) and 
Product 
representation 
 to assess and compare 
 in drawing contracts 
d 
control costs 
d 
control costs 
Risk management ol costs ol costs 
Influence enforces Reduces control costs Reduces control costs 
Dispute resolution d Reduces control costs Reduces control costs 
As shown in Table 2,  A Coder contribute to the reduction of 
transaction costs for buyers and suppliers of IT outsourcing services. Hypotheses 1a, 1b and 1c 
have been confirmed. These three effects amount to an overall positive effect that online 
pertise that SMEs generally face 
Suppliers bid at reverse 
or negotiate privately with 
buyers. Parties benefit from 
standardized project allocation 
procedures. 
Parties benefit from the 
availability o
Reduc
(suppliers volunteer to 
bid) and contract costs (in 
comparison to bilateral 
negotiations). 
Reduces control costs Reduces
Reduces contact a
contract costs 
repository functionality.  
Payments can be managed via 
internal payment system
Payment 
multiple payment options.  
Supplier/ buyer rating and 
feedback system provide 
grounds for trust that w
Authentication 
otherwise be difficult to 
establish in a cross-border 
setting.  
Availability of standardized 
supplier profiles provides an 
easy way
Reduces control costs by
enabling selection of 
higher quality providers. 
Reduces contract costs  
Reduces contact (les
control costs (partners 
are less likely to behave 
opportunistically). 
Reduces contact costs 
suppliers. 
A standard and strict 
marketplace policy provides 
independence from national 
legislations
Regulation 
and solving disputes.  
Creates a common reference 
framework and trust that is hard 
to build in an offshore setting.  
Dedicated team 
Reduced contract an Reduced contract an
Reduces contr Reduces contr
marketplace policies. Users 
violating the rules may be 
expelled from the marketplace. 
Availability of a standard an
strict marketplace policy 
provides independence from 
national legislations in solving 
disputes.  
Net Effect 
 
 
all ten market processes at Rent
Positive  Positive  
marketplaces bring about for SMEs, as indicated in Table 2. 
In summary, online marketplaces thus cater for the needs of SMEs by providing them with 
standardized processes and tools of contacting, contracting, and controlling offshore suppliers 
of IT services. This partially compensates for the lack of ex
when it comes to sourcing and evaluating offshore suppliers, and it also provides 3rd party 
governance of the transactions. In addition, online marketplaces may provide a basis for the 
emergence of institutional trust, thus further reducing opportunism and transaction costs.  
The ten market processes described an the example of Rent A Coder to a large extent represent 
generic functionality that is common to all online marketplaces as can be seen from Table 1. 
5. ENTRY BARRIES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR MARKET 
OUTCOMES 
Achieving a critical m
(Kambil and van Heck 2002). In the case of online markets for IT services, the critical mass on 
 results in decreasing quality of information exchange (Gu and 
Therefore, we suggest that the findings of the analysis can be generalized to the majority of 
online marketplaces for IT services. Differences in the design of these marketplaces, such as 
entry barriers or collaboration functionality, are not crucial for the present analysis. However, 
one of them, namely market entry barriers, is a focus of the following section.  
ass of users is a key factor for online marketplace survival and success 
both buyers’ and suppliers’ side is important. Buyers need enough suppliers to fuel competitive 
bidding at reverse auctions. Suppliers, in their turn, require sufficient amount of opportunities 
to bid on and occasionally win.  
However, low entry barriers allow less informed, less professional or lower quality participants 
to access the marketplace, which
Hitt 2001) and other inefficiencies. Considering the effects of costly bidding and bid evaluation 
on the behavior of buyers and suppliers, Snir and Hitt (2003) found that due to the costs of 
bidding for IT projects, low quality suppliers are more likely to bid for high-value projects with 
a higher expected pay-off. The rising costs of bid evaluation, consequently, result in a situation 
when it becomes uneconomical for a buyer to perform bid evaluation (Snir & Hitt, 2003). The 
buyer may choose to withdraw from the auction without awarding her project to a supplier.  
On the other hand, low entry barriers for buyers facilitate market access for those who do not 
intend to award and execute their projects within the marketplace. Instead, such buyers do 
line suppliers are required to 
nds up by buyer’s selecting one of several auction winners. In practice, however, 
comparison shopping or look for free consultations from bidders. Again, the result is a 
relatively low level of awarded projects (Radkevitch, et al. 2006). 
In this study we focus on entry barriers for suppliers, which exist in two forms – entry fees and 
supplier screening by the marketplace. For instance, at Elance On
pay monthly fee that varies per service package and project category, e.g. USD 295/month for 
Software and Technology category and USD 75 for Writing and Translation category. At Rent 
a Coder, by contrast, no subscription fees are required. Besides, suppliers, applying for “Select” 
status in Elance Online (which provides more marketing and bidding options than other 
subscription types), are screened by the marketplace staff before bidding for projects is 
allowed. Below we formulate hypotheses on the effects of entry barriers for suppliers on the 
market outcomes across three dimensions – project award rate, project value, and buyer 
satisfaction.  
Project award rate is the percentage of buyer’s requests posted through an open reverse 
auction that e
less than 40% of open auctions result in allocated projects (Radkevitch, et al. 2006, Snir and 
Hitt 2003). Lower market entry barriers for suppliers enable lower quality suppliers an easier 
access to the marketplace, as at least some of these suppliers would otherwise abstain from 
investing into accessing the market, anticipating a negative pay-off. Following the argument by 
Snir and Hitt (2003), who found that extensive bidding by lower quality suppliers may lead to 
buyer’s withdrawal from the action, we hypothesize that lower market entry barriers lead to a 
lower project award rate. 
Hypothesis 2. Project award rate will be lower at an online marketplace with lower entry 
barriers for suppliers.  
Buyer satisfaction. Satisfaction with the performance is often used as a proxy for bus
performance (Ganesan 
iness 
1994, Poppo and Zenger 1998). By measuring and comparing buyer 
of 
higher competition among suppliers; lower production costs in 
iers for suppliers. 
6. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS PART 2 
The empirical data for the analysis were obtained from two leading online marketplaces for IT 
services. Marketplace 1 was established in 1998 and encompasses a wide variety of 
satisfaction across projects it must be possible to indirectly evaluate performance in projects 
across an online marketplace. We hypothesize that even if an auction ends up with a project 
award, performing a project with a lower quality supplier may lead to higher costs for the buyer 
due to higher control costs and higher probability of supplier’s opportunism.  
Hypothesis 3. Satisfaction with suppliers will be lower at an online marketplace with lower 
entry barriers for suppliers.  
Project value. Low market entry barriers are likely to result in low bids for a number 
reasons, among which are 
suppliers’ value function due to lesser investments in quality; and higher probability of 
opportunistic bidding due to less reputation at stake. Therefore, our final hypothesis is as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 4. Value of awarded projects will be lower at an online marketplace with lower 
entry barr
6.1. Data 
professional services, from tax consulting to language translation and from creative writing to 
data entry. IT services, such as application development, web design and development, and 
database development represent the most substantial part of the marketplace’s activity. 
Marketplace 2 was founded in 2001 and focused on IT services, with the range of IT services 
similar to that of Marketplace 1. 
In order to minimize the possibility for project heterogeneity to interfere into the causal logic, 
we focus on one subgroup of IT services for testing our hypotheses. Thus the homogeneity of 
6.2. Hypotheses testing and discussion 
We operationalize the relative level of market entry barriers for suppliers via the membership 
fee. Su  t varies depending on the service 
t value, need to be operationalized.  
 the rating 
projects from the different online marketplaces is ensured. We chose to focus on the subgroup 
that is labeled “Database Development” at Marketplace 1 and “Database” at Marketplace 2. 
These categories seem to allow for a more rigorous comparison between the projects from the 
different marketplaces than such subcategories as, for instance, Application development at 
Marketplace 1 and Computer Platforms at Marketplace 2. The projects in “Database 
Development” subgroup at Marketplace 1 were posted between January 26, 2005 and August 6, 
2005. The data on projects in “Database” subgroup at Marketplace 2 covers the period from 
January 1, 2006 to July 7, 2006.  
ppliers at Marketplace 1 do pay a membership fee tha
package (in the case of Database Development sub-category it is USD 245/month), while 
suppliers at Marketplace 2 do not pay an entry fee. Therefore, entry barriers for suppliers at 
Marketplace 1 are higher than Marketplace 2.  
While measuring the percentage of project awards is straightforward, the two other market 
outcomes, buyer satisfaction and average projec
Project value is operationalized through average bid, as in (Radkevitch et al., 2006; Snir et al., 
2003). Buyer’s satisfaction with supplier’s performance is operationalized though
value assigned to supplier for a given project. Although detailed rating is available for a 
number of performance dimensions (Quality, Response, Professionalism, Expertise, Cost, and 
Schedule) at Marketplace 1 we use averaged rating for a more straightforward comparison 
between the marketplaces.  
Besides, the rating scales at Marketplace 1 and Marketplace 2 are different. In the first case the 
rating can take values from 1 to 5 and in the second case from 1 to 10. We multiplied 
0 9.76 1.2786 
10 5.00 4.838 .5832 
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 2) 
14 83 76 12
t sta al tests t out hypoth ependi he propert e 
nderlying data. The results are presented in Table 4. As can be seen from the test results in 
Marketplace 1 
H
Project a Asymp. Sig. (1-
tailed)= 0.268
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in Database category. 
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Database Development 
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Hypothesis 3. 
Buyer’s (
 
Ma tney 
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1.521 d 
projects in gory 
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. 
66 aw rojects 
in Datab ent 
n 26, 
. 
Hypothesis 4. USD 322.4 USD 756.8 T-test n 
n 
Hypothesis 1 was formulated as follows: pro ard rate will be lower at an online 
 with lower entry barriers fo  
hether the proportion of project awards at Marketplace 1 (34.96%) was significantly different 
satisfaction values from Marketplace 1 by 2, in order to be able to make comparison. 
Descriptive statistics for the data is presented in Table 3. 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Satisfaction 
(Marketplace 2) 
1521 1.00 10.0
Satisfaction 
(Marketplace 1) 
66 1.
Average bid 
(Marketplace
Average bid 
2175 4.00 9404 322.43 680.84 
(Marketplace
 
1 75.00 57 2.71 80.20 
We applied differen tistic o test eses, d ng on t ies of th
u
Table 4, Hypotheses 2 and 3 rejected, while Hypothesis 4 is confirmed.  
Table 4. Hypotheses testing  
Value  Data  
 Market. 2 Market. 1 Test Marketplace 2 
ypothesis 2. 33.48% 34.96% Binomial test 4.538 projects posted in
ward rate. 
2005
satisfaction. 
9.76 
(out of 10) 
9.66 
4.83 out of 
5) 
nn-Whi
U=173
Z= -17.20 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed)=0.00
awarded and rate
Database cate
between Jan 1 2006 and J
7, 2006 in Database category
2.175 awarded projects i
arded and rated p
ase Developm
category posted betwee
2005 and August 6, 2005
143 awarded projects in 
Project value 
(average bid). 
 
Sig.=0.000 Database category betwee
Jan 1 2006 and July 7, 2006 
in Database category. 
Database Development 
category posted between 26, 
2005 and August 6, 2005. 
ject aw
marketplace r suppliers. We applied binomial test to find out 
w
from a benchmark. proportion, which in this case was the proportion of project awards at 
Marketplace 2 (33.48%). The outcome of the test indicates that the difference between the 
means is not significant (0.268). It can be argued that the test results lacked significance 
because of the small size of the project sample from Marketplace 1; with a larger sample the 
difference between the proportions of awarded projects at both marketplaces could have been 
significant. However, even in that case the support for the Hypothesis 2 would not be very 
persuasive and an explanation for that is required. One possible explanation can be that despite 
the fact that lower market entry barriers allow for the entry of lower quality suppliers, there is a 
sufficient number of high quality suppliers at both marketplaces, whose good performance over 
a number of projects has been certified via the rating and feedback system. Therefore, the fact 
that there might be lower quality suppliers at Marketplace 2 does not affect the award rate as 
there are a sufficient number of higher quality suppliers for a buyer to choose from.  
Hypothesis 2 was formulated as follows: Satisfaction with suppliers will be lower at an online 
marketplace with lower entry barriers for suppliers. This hypothesis was not only rejected in its 
original form, but it appears that the average satisfaction at Marketplace 2 is marginally but 
ge price for database-related projects at Marketplace 1 (USD 756.8) appeared 
significantly higher than at Marketplace 1. Remarkably, the average ratings (9.59 out of 10 and 
4.83 out of 5) both are extremely close to the highest limit of respective rating scale. A possible 
explanation for such a distribution of rating values may be that the rating systems are used by 
the buyers primarily to reward suppliers for good performance and to punish for bad 
performance rather than for objective performance evaluation. This explains a very high 
proportion of the highest project ratings – 89% of ratings at Marketplace 1 and 94% at 
Marketplace 2.  
Hypothesis 3 was formulated as follows: Value of awarded projects will be lower at an online 
marketplace with lower entry barriers for suppliers. This hypothesis has been confirmed. 
Moreover, avera
to be almost two and a half times higher than at Marketplace 2 (USD 322.4). Such a 
considerable difference might be explained by a) higher competition between suppliers at 
Marketplace 2, triggered by lower entry barriers and easier access to the marketplace; b) by 
lower quality and more probably opportunistic behavior of suppliers at Marketplace 2; c) 
suppliers at Marketplace 2 do not need to compensate for entry fees (suppliers at Marketplace 1 
pay up to USD 245 in monthly membership fee to be able to place bids for projects in Database 
Development category).  
This paper looked at the sim
7. CONCLUSIONS 
ilarities and differences among online marketplaces for IT services 
and their effects for SMEs engaging in offshore IT outsourcing. The contribution of this paper 
is tw  how online marketplaces for IT services affect transaction costs 
ir effects on the market outcomes. Datasets from two leading online 
o-fold. First, we analyzed
of contacting, contracting, and controlling of SMEs in offshore IT outsourcing. Ten market 
processes were scrutinized along the lines of the process-stakeholder analysis framework 
(Kambil and van Heck 1998). We conclude that the effect of these processes (product 
representation, regulation, risk management, influence, dispute resolution, search, pricing, 
logistics (service delivery), payment and settlement, and authentication) is to reduce transaction 
costs of offshore outsourcing, thereby enabling SMEs to enjoy the relevant advantages (low 
costs, flexibility, access to a wide pool of resources) – a luxury previously available only to 
large companies.  
Second, while online marketplaces make the access to offshore resources easier, differences in 
market design lead to different market outcomes. We focused on the market entry barriers for 
suppliers, and the
marketplaces were used for the empirical analysis. Hypotheses testing showed that supplier 
entry conditions make a significant difference for the value of projects performed at a 
marketplace. No impact on the rate of project awards was found. Buyer satisfaction with the 
supplier performance was marginally but significantly higher at the marketplace with lower 
entry barriers.  
When analyzed together, the results of the second part of our investigation lead to an 
interesting conclusion. Contrary to the expectations, lower market entry barriers for supplier do 
not lead to worse market outcomes from an offshore outsourcing buyer perspective, as the 
 arguments could have been made stronger if 
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